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I. INTRODUCTION
Applying knowledge from other social sciences makes particular
sense with the law and economics of the family. Much of the behavior
we see and experience within families is difficult to see or understand as
economically rational, that is, narrowly self-interested.1 Many of the
legal changes we make that appear to be rational, at least from a costbenefit perspective, turn out to be unsatisfying or even counterproductive.
Though economists tend to view motivations or “utility functions” based

* William G. Hammond Professor, University of Iowa. With deep thanks to my
fellow panelists, June Carbone and Sarah Ramsey.
1. Perplexing examples include, on the negative side, unpremeditated family
violence, and on the positive side, love itself. For Gary Becker’s attempts to fit abusers
and lovers into the homo economicus paradigm, see generally GARY S. BECKER, A
TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (2d ed. 1991); ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974). For a sympathetic
view, see RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 3–5 (1992). For a more nuanced and
less sympathetic approach, see JENNIFER ROBACK MORSE, LOVE & ECONOMICS: WHY THE
LAISSEZ-FAIRE FAMILY DOESN’T WORK 174–77 (2001).
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upon “revealed preference,”2 extended models like that of socioeconomics
go below what is revealed to measure, as best we can, people’s attitudes
and feelings about what may be the same phenomena.3 Motivation, in
this view, is far more complex than economists’ simple rational actor
model suggests.4 In particular, the socioeconomics model presents worlds
in which fairness and justice are explicitly taken into account. Good
empirical research should track this difference in emphasis because
fairness and justice, and feelings about them, matter. If researchers stop
at the level of counting, important though this is, policy decisions that
ought to be made on the basis of solid research may have what we call
design defects in products liability. They will ultimately “crash” because
they are based upon a skeletal model of human motivation that
frequently does not include distributional concerns or feelings that go
beyond narrow self-interest.
Further, we can distinguish socioeconomics as a discipline, or at least
a subdiscipline, in part because empirical work plays such an important
role for socioeconomics. Thus, we pay attention to Milton Friedman’s
famous observation that the value of the rational actor model lies not in
the truth of its depiction of human thinking, which we can only grasp at,
in any event, but in its prediction of future behavior.5 Many of the
articles we can read in recent issues of the American Economic Review
or the Journal of Legal Studies seem to use the model in ways that do
not depend upon empirical confirmation.6
2. DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 52–53 (2d ed. 1985);
HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 141–43 (2d ed. 1984).
3. For examples from the legal literature, see Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive
Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational
Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1235–39 (1998); Robin West,
Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1449,
1453–56 (1986).
4. MORSE, supra note 1, at 11–22 (discussing the difference between homo
economicus—the rational economic actor—and most of us; the rational economic man
might be a person with attachment disorder or a sociopath).
5. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 4–7 (1953).
6. Gillian Hadfield mentioned one talk she had heard about love being described
completely as interlocking utility functions and then going on to derive various
mathematical conclusions from the derivates. I have used her story in class as a
launching point for lively discussions about the validity of using economic theory in
family law at all. This does not invalidate the simplification typical of economics. For
example, when describing bargaining behavior at divorce, I frequently begin with
Mnookin and Kornhauser’s Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law. Robert H. Mnookin
& Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979). Mnookin and Kornhauser reduce divorce bargaining, a
complicated and multifaceted process at the very least, to two dimensions—money and
time with children. Id. at 952–55. This simplification, typical of economics in general,
sits uneasily in my students’ stomachs. The difference is that many of the points made in
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This concern is not limited only to family researchers and policy
gurus. Our students may suffer from the same myopia if they merely
learn doctrine or even doctrine with a theory. One of my colleagues, at a
highly ranked law school, taught family law for one term just to learn
about it. He remarked to me recently that he had no idea how difficult it
was. The students wanted to talk not just about the cases but about their
own experiences and attitudes. He felt pulled in ways he had never been
in his more typical classes, and though it was fun, he would not want to
do it again. It was too “messy.”
On the other hand, law classes are not meant to work on group therapy
or listen to strings of personal narratives, though our students may feel a
bit of both goes on as they privately reflect on the material presented. In
what we ask them to read and have them discuss in class, we are
constantly challenged with how to broaden students as fledgling lawyers
so they view their jobs as not only dealing with legal doctrine but also
struggling with deep human and societal problems. Properly used,
socioeconomics can change this lens for the literature and the classroom.
Thus, I argue here that family law should take into account underlying
human and societal problems. Socioeconomics helps students systematically
examine those issues in ways that go beyond the anecdotal. Empirical
research can help set up such discussions.7 I give two examples coming
from my own empirical work that I use in my class. Both of the examples
reflect significant policy debates: Divorce and child welfare law are
taught in nearly every family law survey course. Both of these would
seem to have relatively simple legal and economic explanations and
solutions. But as we dig deeper, or go behind the usual market-based
solutions, cases, and statutory law, the picture rapidly becomes more
complicated. Closer analysis reveals the disutility of facile solutions,8
this article can be tested empirically, and both Mnookin and I, among others, have
subsequently done so. See Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Legal Rules,
Bargaining, and Transactions Costs: The Case of Divorce, in SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS IN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 91, 98 (Stuart S. Nagel & Miriam K. Mills eds., 1991); see also
ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 1–5 (1992).
7. I am making simultaneous arguments that empirical work helps define
socioeconomics and that socioeconomics frequently plays a major role in a full family
law discussion. I thank June Carbone for pointing this complexity out to me.
8. Of course, as Sarah Ramsey noted, there are problems with many of the social
science studies used in family litigation and to support legislative reform. See Sarah H.
Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Using Social Science Research in Family Law Analysis and
Formation: Problems and Prospects, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 631, 631–33 (1994); see also
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the “polycentrism” of the problems (to quote Lon Fuller),9 and, frequently,
the unexpected results of legal change.10 As an empiricist, I am struck
with the power of these findings, and I have found that others, including
students, react positively as well.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF DIVORCE RATES
Earlier pieces in this symposium by Professors Dallas and Carbone
describe how socioeconomics is a process of going behind the observed
data and particularly the utility functions assumed by economists. One
example of a topic that could be considered using various tools is the
national changes in divorce rates.11 We typically present this fairly early
in the family law course as part of our treatment of divorce reform, or,
perhaps, the current backlash against no-fault divorce. As Figure 1
shows, the rates per 1000 population rose until the 1980s, leveled off,
and have declined since then.12
A strictly legal approach, one favored by at least some of my students,
might be not to care what has happened to divorce rates at all. Because
most states have no-fault divorce, why not just skip ahead to the more
controversial matters of property distribution and child custody? There
will of course be debate about whether, as the Coase theorem13 might
predict, change in the law would not change the number of divorces
(outcomes) but would change the distribution of wealth, as people would
have to bargain out of instead of into divorce.14 My own view, because
even no-fault divorce does involve significant transaction costs, is to

Margaret F. Brinig, Empirical Work in Family Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1083, 1084–86.
9. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
393–400 (1978). “Polycentric” problems are those in which a change in one thing
affects a host of others. Fuller uses the example of an art museum’s selection from the
estate of a collector. Id. at 394.
10. For one such well-known (and flawed) study, see LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA ix–xi (1985); Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics
of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support
Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1183–84 (1981); see also Margaret F. Brinig & Steven
M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 869–70 (1994).
11. Professor Carbone has made much the same point in terms of spousal support.
If the class is going to discuss the topic at all, conclusions will be shaped by assumptions
footed in socioeconomic analysis, which ought to be made explicit.
12. See infra Figure 1.
13. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–6 (1960).
14. Compare H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints
and Private Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437, 437 (1986) (arguing that the change in the
law would have no effect on the divorce rate), with Leora Friedberg, Did Unilateral
Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 608, 608
(1998) (arguing that the “no-fault revolution” will, and has, raised divorce rates).
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ignore this debate in class.15 The straight law and economic approach
might suppose that the legal change brought about the observed change.16
Then, if one supposed that divorce was bad, either because two households
are less efficient or produce less wealth than one, or because kids are
less well off in many cases,17 a concerned and powerful lawyer might
propose a change in divorce laws.18
However, a broader approach might use labor force data beginning at
the same time to cast doubt that the legal change was the leading
instrumental in the pattern of divorce rates. Figure 2 attempts to do this,
using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.19 The change in women’s labor
force participation shows a dramatic increase in both the numbers of
women at every age who have entered the labor force and, especially as
contrasted with the low divorce rate time of the 1950s, women’s
persistence in the labor force, even during prime childbearing age. The
change apparently begins before the “divorce revolution” and does so in
nearly every other industrialized country as well as in the United States.20
This observation might lead one to think that law follows social change21
and that a change in divorce rules now might be at best counterproductive.22
15. I have not done so in my writing. See Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, NoFault Laws and At-Fault People, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 325, 325 (1998); Margaret F.
Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and
Transaction Costs, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 279, 279–82 (1993). See generally
Brinig & Crafton, supra note 10.
16. Brinig & Buckley, supra note 15, at 358.
17. This is certainly true in a financial sense, and may be in a psychological one, at
least for the short term. For two contrasting analyses on the second point, compare
JUDITH WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR
LANDMARK STUDY 297–98 (2000), with E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR
BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED 7–8 (2002).
18. See generally LINDA J. WAITE ET AL., DOES DIVORCE MAKE PEOPLE HAPPY?
FINDINGS FROM A STUDY OF UNHAPPY MARRIAGES (2002) (discussing the need to make
marriage difference from divorce and suggesting strengthening divorce laws as part of
the solution).
19. See infra Figure 2. The entire display, an animated PowerPoint series, is
available at Margaret F. Brinig, Powerpoint Display on Labor Force Participation, at
http://www.uiowa.edu/~mfblaw (last visited Jan. 20, 2004). The PowerPoint display
contains men’s (nearly constant) and women’s (changing) labor force participation over
the life course for years 1948–2001.
20. Douglas W. Allen, No-Fault Divorce in Canada: Its Cause and Effect, 37 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 129, 133–35, 147 (1998).
21. See WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATTERNS 8–11 (1993).
22. But see Richard G. Wilkins, International Law, Social Change and the Family,
Address Before the International Society of Family Law World Congress, Plenary
Session (Aug. 9, 2002).
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A thoughtful student might then want to go further. Why does
women’s labor force behavior increase the divorce rate (and the demand
for no-fault divorce)? Is it because working women have more money
and therefore can exit marriages they could not have left before?23 Is it
because a woman with a job—or, better yet, a career—has other things
than the household to give her self-esteem and basically does not need
her husband if he is not contributing emotionally? Men apparently
benefit from, and stay in, even emotionally bankrupt marriages.24
Women do not.
Does the women’s malaise stem, as Professor Dallas notes in her
materials and others have noted elsewhere, from the fact that men have
not picked up the household jobs as their wives’ labor force behavior has
changed? In other words, young men’s roles today are remarkably
similar to their grandfathers’ roles, while women’s roles are dramatically
different.25 Do the consequent “gender wars”26 over household jobs
increase wives’ but not husbands’ dissatisfaction, so that with lower cost
divorces available and the means to support themselves, women will just
leave? This might be the simple rational actor model. My own research
with Steven Nock27 indicates that the problem is still more complicated
and resides at some distance from rational actor market behavior. If the
household work that is picked up by men is “women’s work” (dishes,
cooking, laundry, grocery shopping, cleaning), marital stability decreases.28
But if husbands realize that women are unfairly treated in the division of
labor, the marriages tend to be very stable ones. Thus it is not just what
is chosen that matters, but how the people involved feel about the
choice. When I present students with this set of feelings, they tend to
23. A recent piece by demographers Liana Sayer and Suzanne Bianchi suggests that
this is not a large part of the story. Liana C. Sayer & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Women’s
Economic Independence and the Probability of Divorce: A Review and Reexamination, 21 J.
FAM. ISSUES 906, 908, 932–33 (2000). But financially powerful women, who could leave
marriages, did not do so more often. The best predictor of divorce was the women’s, not their
husbands’, dissatisfaction with the emotional quality of the marriages. Id. at 932–33.
24. A still more recent study, with a number of methodological problems, shows
that children’s depressive symptoms are most strongly linked to their fathers’ level of
marital satisfaction and marital stability. Linna Wang & D. Russell Crane, The
Relationship Between Marital Satisfaction, Marital Stability, Nuclear Family
Triangulation, and Childhood Depression, 29 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 337, 337–43 (2001).
25. Steven L. Nock & Margaret F. Brinig, Weak Men and Disorderly Women:
Divorce and the Division of Labor, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE 171, 172–73 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002).
26. Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1559–62 (1991).
27. Nock & Brinig, supra note 25, at 171–74.
28. See infra Table 1. When women add additional hours of women’s work,
marital stability decreases as well. Additional hours of “men’s work” (household
repairs, lawn care, car maintenance) by either spouse increase marital stability. Id.
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become very involved in the discussion. They see the interaction
between family issues and labor force problems29 and the gendered
nature of marriage.30 I would then ask the following: What does this
mean for family lawyers or law reformers? Mandating equal sharing of
housework, despite its surface appeal, might be a really bad idea.31
Getting people to think in terms outside those of an “exchange
relationship”32 (the sociologists’ term) or tit for tat33 (the economists’
term) works much better for stabilizing marriage.34 But is stabilizing
inequality the same as stabilizing inequity?35 The discussion might flow
29. See generally JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1–9 (2000); Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at
Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89, 91–
93 (1993); Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for
Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 514–15 (1998); Joan C. Williams, Canaries
in the Mine: Work/Family Conflict and the Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221, 2238 (2002).
30. See generally Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for
Valuing Women’s Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17,
33 (1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Multivocal Prejudices and Homo Equality, 74 IND.
L.J. 1085, 1109 (1999); Martha Albertson Fineman, Introduction to AT THE BOUNDARIES
OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet
Thomadsen eds., 1991); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why
Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of
Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1537 (1993). For a sociological
argument that marriage necessarily promotes gender, especially masculinity, see Steven
L. Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1974, 1977 (2000).
Marriage is the primary locale in which gender is experienced because it is
where our sexual lives are realized. . . .
....
The married household has been described as a “gender factory” because it is
in the performance of routine and prosaic tasks that husbands and wives create
and sustain their identities as men or women.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
31. The experiment was attempted in East Germany before reunification. While
labor force participation increased, the divorce rate soared. See generally Margaret F.
Brinig, Equality and Sharing: Views of Household Across the Iron Curtain, 7 EUR. J.L.
& ECON. 55 (1998).
32. Gary L. Hansen, Moral Reasoning and the Marital Exchange Relationship,
131 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 71, 72–73 (1991).
33. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 8–9 (1984); THOMAS
C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 5 (1980); Alvin E. Roth & Francoise
Schoumaker, Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 362, 371 (1983).
34. Steven L. Nock, Turn-Taking as Rational Behavior, 27 SOC. SCI. RES. 235,
243–44 (1998).
35. For an argument that they are not the same, see Nock, supra note 30, at 1977–
78 (“Inequality in marriage is fair because it is how femininity and masculinity are
created and defined.”).
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easily, and has in some of my classes, into whether a lower divorce rate
is something to strive for, or whether marriage itself is a flawed
institution.36 How would you write laws to discourage the exchange
relationship? Covenant marriage with required counseling might be one
solution.37 Elizabeth Scott’s long waiting period38 or divorce only with
mutual consent39 are others. I am not convinced that any of these
options presents a total solution and am more interested in getting rid of
incentives to divorce that many laws, particularly custody laws, seem to
provide.40
Nor is the solution apparently premarital cohabitation (or trial marriage),
though it does produce more stable marriages in a few Western
European countries.41 This trend might explain the pattern we see in the
United States after 1980, particularly the temporary rise in the age at
first marriage.42 Thus, we might see delays in marriage because of
women’s stronger ties to the labor force, cohabitation as a prelude to
marriage because people (justly) feared divorce,43 and some weeding out
36. For arguments that it is, see Fineman, supra note 30, at xi–xvi; Polikoff, supra
note 30, at 1537. But see Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me, Bill: Should
Cohabitation Be the Default Option?, in MARRIAGE: FOR AND AGAINST (A. Bernstein
ed., forthcoming ) (manuscript on file with author).
37. Covenant marriage is authorized in Arizona, Arkansas, and Louisiana. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (2000); Covenant Marriage Act of 2001, ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-11-801 to 9-11-811 (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
9:272–9:284 (West 2000); see Margaret Brinig & Steven Nock, Covenant and Contract,
12 REGENT U. L. REV. 9, 10–11 (1999); Alan J. Hawkins et al., Attitudes About Covenant
Marriage and Divorce: Policy Implications from a Three-State Comparison, 51 FAM.
REL. 166, 168 (2002).
38. Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76
VA. L. REV. 9, 76–78 (1990); see also Robert M. Gordon, The Limits of Limits on
Divorce, 107 YALE L.J. 1435, 1464–65 (1998).
39. ALLEN M. PARKMAN, GOOD INTENTIONS GONE AWRY: NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND
THE AMERICAN FAMILY 188–90 (2000).
40. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots Are Made for Walking”:
Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 130, 157–60 (2000).
41. For Britain, Kathleen Kiernan has estimated that eight percent of couples who
get married before their first child is born split up within five years of the child’s birth.
The figure is twenty-five percent for cohabiting couples who marry after their babies are
born and fifty-two percent for those cohabiting couples who never marry. Kathleen
Kiernan, Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe, POPULATION TRENDS,
Winter 1999, at 19 tbl.11. Without children, if couples cohabit instead of “marrying
directly,” they are ten and one-half times more likely to experience dissolution.
Kathleen Kiernan, Cohabitation in Western Europe, POPULATION TRENDS, Summer
1999, at 30 tbl.7. Only slightly more than twenty percent of cohabiting partnerships
survive ten years. Note that because of the difference in time periods measured, the
childless and childbearing couples cannot be compared directly. Id.
42. Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for
Children’s Family Contexts in United States, 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 32–33 (2000).
43. Thus, the cohabitation rate is higher for people who have previously divorced
or whose parents have divorced. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, “I Only Want
Trust”: Norms, Trust, and Autonomy, 32 J. SOCIO-ECON. 471, 483–84 (2003).
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of partnerships that does not work. We might expect as a consequence a
smaller number of married people, affecting the raw divorce rate, and
perhaps a lower rate of marriage breakdown, or divorces per married
couple.44 But, so far, and contrary to what economic search theory
would predict, cohabitation without prior plans to marry is one of the
best predictors of marital instability, not stability, even when controlling
for socioeconomic status.45
Economists, many family law teachers, and even Professor Dallas in
her teaching materials, tend to leave children as an afterthought when
thinking about marriage and family issues. Martha Fineman does not,
and focuses instead on dependency, direct and derivative.46 A focus on
children and what is best for them might point one, as in quite different
ways it has Professors Fineman and Carbone,47 in the direction of more
state support for childrearing. For Elizabeth Scott,48 Dean Bartlett,49
other supporters of the ALI project,50 and me,51 changing child custody
laws upon divorce and separation from nonmarital relationships seems
more promising.
So, our discussion on divorce can lead to an introduction of alternatives
to marriage, the gendered nature of marriage roles, and the centrality of
children for thinking about families. These are sidetracks that may take
at least one class period. For students to see their worth, returning the
44. Stéphane Mechoulan, Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American Family
28–30 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
45. Brinig & Nock, supra note 36, at 30–33 (extending this discussion); see also
Nock & Brinig, supra note 25, at 180–81.
46. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 161–64 (1995); Martha L.A. Fineman,
Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2200
(1995).
47. See June Carbone, Has the Gender Divide Become Unbridgable? The Implications
for Social Equality, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 31, 53–59 (2001); June Carbone, Morality,
Public Policy and the Family: The Role of Marriage and the Public/Private Divide, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267, 281–82 (1996).
48. Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80
CAL. L. REV. 615, 618–19 (1992).
49. Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the American
Law Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the Individual Child’s
Best Interests, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 467, 480–83 (1999).
50. Ira Mark Ellman, Chief Reporter’s Preface to PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS xiii–xiv (Tentative Draft No.
3, 1998) (“Children are necessarily at the heart of any set of principles of family law.”).
51. Margaret F. Brinig, Feminism and Child Custody Under Chapter Two of the
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 301, 301–04 (2001).
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discussion to law at a number of junctures will be difficult but necessary.
Thus, we could refer usefully to legal schemes for slowing down the
divorce process, making cohabitation the legal equivalent of marriage,52
or mandating—or assuming—equality in housework.53
III. ADOPTION, FOSTER CARE, AND KINSHIP CARE
As a second example, I would like to talk about the politically divisive
topic of child welfare and, in particular, foster care.54 Why aren’t these
children, particularly African-American children, quickly moving into
adoption, given the new emphasis on “protection” of the children?55 Is
the best solution here a legal one that mandates “colorblindness” in
adoptive placement56 (which, because adoption is less expensive for the
state than foster care, would also be a cheap solution)? Is the best
solution one that supports racial matching for reasons other than
financial or economic considerations of maintaining cultural heritage or
family ties?57 The best solution may not be a legal one at all, if the
original problems in the birth family simply manifested poverty.58 But
52. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 6.05, at 55 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) (“Domestic-partnership property should be
divided according to the principles set forth for the division of marital property . . . .”);
Wendy M. Schrama, Registered Partnerships in the Netherlands, 13 INT’L J.L. POL’Y &
FAM. 315, 315–16 (1999) (noting that in 1998, legislation in the Netherlands made
cohabitation the functional equivalent of marriage).
53. Brinig, supra note 31, at 55 (describing the former East Germany’s statutory
mandate for equal sharing of household tasks).
54. See infra Table 2. Professor Carbone makes the point that there are some
topics socioeconomic analysis reveals that otherwise would not come up. She decided to
discuss Norplant in class because of the gender issues it raised rather than because it was
a doctrinal topic that necessarily needed to be included. Similarly, adoption might or
might not be chosen for discussion in the basic family law course, but lends itself to indepth socioeconomic analysis for those eager to discuss race and poverty. The foster
care system is particularly suited for such discussions. Of the children in foster
placement, an unequal number—thirty-nine percent—were black, compared to thirtyfour percent who were white. Black children are also less likely to be adopted than are
white children and remain longer in foster care. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT: INTERIM FY 1999 ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE
2001 (6), at 2 (2001), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/
june2001.pdf.
55. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 629a, 671, 675, 1320a-9 (2000)).
56. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat.
1755, § 1808 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671a (2000)) (removing barriers to
interethnic adoption).
57. Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family System in the Black Community: A
Child-Centered Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1649, 1658–69 (1995);
Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and
Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 33, 39–40 (1993–94).
58. Dorothy E. Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support for Children,
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in those cases where jobs, training, education, and financial assistance
will not resolve the problem in the birth family,59 what legal solutions
might make a difference?
Again, a quick solution, and one familiar to family law students,
would be to ignore the problem. Many states have ignored the problem,
with increasingly higher proportions of African-American children
remaining until “graduation” from foster care.60 All economists would
suggest that at least part of the problem is the inefficiency of government
actors, with bureaucrats failing to sever parental rights quickly enough in
cases appropriate for adoption and lacking the flexibility to arrange inhome support or kinship care in other cases. Conversely, more direct
subsidization of the custodial parent would then arguably increase the
number of children born to parents who lack the resources, emotional as
well as monetary, to care for them in the first place. The law and
economics or market solution would be to allow whites to adopt children
of color.61 A bow to cultural sensitivity suggests kinship care, currently
an alternative to the termination of parental rights and adoption under
the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act.62 Recently, though, this
solution has come under attack from critical race theorist Dorothy
Roberts, who notes that kinship care might make economically
marginalized mothers place children in foster care with close relatives
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1619, 1620–21 (2001); see also Leslie Doty Hollingsworth,
Symbolic Interactionism, African American Families, and the Transracial Adoption
Controversy, 44 SOC. WORK 443, 445–46 (1999).
59. Roberts, supra note 58, at 1623 (citing “[s]kyrocketing female incarceration
rates, cutbacks in social services, the AIDS epidemic, and maternal substance abuse” as
the reasons for placement with relatives, especially grandmothers).
60. In April 2001, 39% of the 581,000 children in foster care were black, nonHispanic. Only 29% of the exits to adoption were black, while 42% of the children
awaiting adoption were black. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 54. All
of these numbers are in excess of the 15.89% of children under 18 in the United States
who are African-American, as of March 2000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION BY AGE,
SEX, AND RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: MARCH 2000 (2001), http://www.census.gov/
population/socdemo/race/black/ppl-142/tab01.txt.
61. See RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, ADOPTION, RACE, AND IDENTITY:
FROM INFANCY THROUGH ADOLESCENCE 1–2 (1992); RITA JAMES SIMON & HOWARD
ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 26–29 (1977); Rita J. Simon, Transracial Adoptions:
Does the Law Matter?, AM. EXPERIMENT Q., Fall 1999, at 90.
62. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115,
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (providing that “in determining
reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a child, as described in this paragraph, and
in making such reasonable efforts, the child’s health and safety shall be the paramount
concern”).
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solely to take advantage of slightly more generous than welfare foster
care subsidies.63
In turn, a strong focus on child welfare leads to one of two solutions:
subsidize adoption because of problems with any type of foster care,64
which, upon empirical study, seems to be the appropriate solution for all
except African-American children,65 or increase subsidies to poor mothers
who take advantage of extended families, which seems the best for
African-American children.66 This focus might lead us to look at the
impact of various legal choices about child placement from the child’s
perspective.
This theoretical solution, like the analysis of the divorce rate question,
can be tested empirically. Steven Nock and I utilize the National
Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health) dataset67 to
examine the effects of family form (living with birth mothers, adoption,
kinship care, foster care) on a group of outcomes. Specifically, we were
trying to isolate the effect of family form on (1) depression (measured on
the nineteen-item Centers for Epidemiological Studies (CESD2) depression
scale, mean = 13.4, standard deviation = 5.9),68 (2) drug usage (monthly
63. Roberts, supra note 58, at 1629–30; see also Naomi R. Cahn, Children’s
Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
1189, 1200 (1999).
64. This is the position I urge. Margaret F. Brinig, Moving Toward a First-Best
World: Minnesota’s Position on Multiethnic Adoptions, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 553,
592–93 (2001).
65. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, How Much Does Legal Status Matter?
Adoptions by Kin Caregivers, 36 FAM. L.Q. 449, 466–67 (2002) (arguing that while for
African-American children, kinship care functions very much like adoption or living
with a birth parent, for other groups it functions like foster care, with less desirable
outcomes).
66. Roberts, supra note 58, at 1626–27.
67. Carolina Population Center, National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health,
at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/design (last modified July 25, 2003). The
description, found on their website, reads as follows:
Add Health is a school-based study of the health-related behaviors of
adolescents in grades 7 to 12. It has been designed to explore the causes of
these behaviors, with an emphasis on the influence of social context. That
is, Add Health postulates that families, friends, schools, and communities
play roles in the lives of adolescents that may encourage healthy choices or
may lead to unhealthy, self-destructive behavior. Data to support or refute
this theory were collected in surveys of students, parents, and school
administrators. . . .
Add Health has been funded by the National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development (NICHD) and 17 other federal agencies. Field work for
Waves I and II was conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the
University of Chicago.
Id. The study is available at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth. Again, the
regression analysis was done by Steven L. Nock, Department of Sociology, University of
Virginia.
68. See infra Table 3.
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use of alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana, mean = 1.55, standard deviation
= 3.45),69 (3) juvenile delinquency (measured on a 15-point scale developed
by the Add Health researchers, mean = 5.22, standard deviation =
6.83),70 and (4) morbidity, or the fear of dying or being killed young.
The results differ for white and black adolescents.71 While drug usage
and juvenile delinquency might be viewed as typical fodder for
economists because they reveal preferences, depression and morbidity
again reveal attitudes and not just choices.
In the socioeconomics tradition, Nock and I report that these regressions
reveal differences that are not merely statistically noteworthy, but are
also meaningful in a real sense. This is another point worth mentioning
to classes. Even if research is set up according to established academic
practice, it may reveal statistically significant differences that have
almost no real impact in real life. Policymakers should be slow to act on
results of statistical significance alone.72 Further, expert witnesses
should not add much weight to court decisions when they can show no
real impact of one variable on another.73

Id.

69. Id.
70. See Brinig & Nock, supra note 65, at 464 n.54.
The questions were recorded and played for the respondent over a headset.
The adolescent answered the questions on a laptop computer provided to
assure greater confidentiality: 1) In the past 12 months, how often did you
paint graffiti or signs on someone else’s property or in a public place[?] 2) In
the past 12 months, how often did you deliberately damage property that didn’t
belong to you[?] 3) In the past 12 months, how often did you lie to your
parents or guardians about where you had been or whom you were with? 4)
How often did you take something from a store without paying for it? 5) How
often did you get into a serious physical fight? 6) How often did you hurt
someone badly enough to need bandages or care from a doctor or nurse? 7)
How often did you run away from home? 8) How often did you drive a car
without the owner’s permission? 9) In the past 12 months, how often did you
steal something worth more than $50? 10) How often did you go into a house
or building to steal something? 11) How often did you use or threaten to use a
weapon to get something from someone? 12) How often did you sell
marijuana or other drugs? 13) How often did you steal something worth less
than $50? 14) In the past 12 months, how often did you take part in a fight
where a group of your friends was against another group? 15) How often were
you loud or unruly in a public place?

71. See infra Tables 4 & 5. A summary table is reported as Table 6.
72. Deirdre N. McCloskey & Stephen T. Ziliak, The Standard Error of Regressions,
34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 97, 104–06 (1996).
73. Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal
Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 108, 138,
152; Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 8, at 648–55.
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Nock and I find that for white children, being in foster care increases
the monthly frequency of drug usage by nearly four occurrences, or
more than a standard deviation,74 where the average reported monthly
usage was 1.55. The juvenile delinquency scale increases by more than
five, where the average was five—nearly a standard deviation. Now the
socioeconomics point: For African-American adolescents, foster care
increases the depression index by more than five, where the average is
thirteen, an increase of nearly a standard deviation, and morbidity by
.08, an increase of more than half a standard deviation. Yet on any of
these four measures, kinship care is not statistically different from living
with one’s birth mother.
What can the class learn? A facially neutral law can have very
different effects on culturally distinct groups. Culture matters and
differences may turn up on hard-to-measure dimensions such as attitudes
and fears. Finally, a solution that seems to work well for one subset of
the population (African-Americans) may be very dangerous or
counterproductive when applied to others (whites or other ethnic
groups). These lessons about culture, race, and overgeneralization from
local experiences, even studied well, need to be taught again and again
in family law. We have shown how they affect state intervention for
child welfare. They also can be applied to discussions about mandatory
arrests for family violence,75 division of labor in the household, as
reported earlier, and child custody, particularly transracial adoption.76
What lessons can we learn from considering socioeconomics in family
law? First, we can learn that our initial conjectures, even while wellinformed, may be misleading and simply wrong. Second, we can learn
that public policy implemented without delving more deeply, as we have
begun to do here, may create perverse incentives or results. Third, we
can learn just how much we do not know. At a time when more than
half a million children are in foster care, it makes sense to see whether
we should encourage kin foster parents, move the children to adoptive
homes, or simply increase the provision of services to birth parents. It
also makes sense to know that the cultural heritage of the child may
make a difference in terms of what is best for him or her.

74. See infra Table 3.
75. Brinig, supra note 8, at 1083–84.
76. See Brinig, supra note 64, at 583 (describing generally transracial adoption and
policies, pro and con).
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IV. CHARTS AND TABLES
FIGURE 1
U.S. DIVORCE RATES, 1949–200177
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77. Data compiled from NAT’L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS (2001),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ (last modified July 19, 2002).
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FIGURE 2
CHANGING LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION78
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78. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION RATES FOR WOMEN, 1948–2001 (2003), available at http://www.bls.gov
(last modified Sept. 3, 2003).
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TABLE 1
CONTRIBUTORS TO DIVORCE OR SEPARATION— NSFH FIRST
MARRIAGE79
Model 1
Variable

Coefficient

Risk of
Divorce

Model 2
Coefficient

Model 3

Risk of
Divorce

Coefficient

Model 4

Risk of
Divorce

B

Risk of
Divorce

I: Control Variables
Cohabited

1.7717

5.8808**

1.6776

5.3528**

1.6677

5.2998**

1.6651

5.2863**

Number of Children

-0.6076

0.5447**

-0.6187

0.5387**

-0.6291

.5331**

-0.6475

0.5234**

Husband’s Wages

-0.0019

0.9981

-0.0047

0.9953

-0.0046

0.9954

-0.005

0.9951

Wife’s Wages

-0.0101

0.9899

-0.013

0.987

-0.0108

0.9893

-0.0103

0.9898

0.4167

1.5169*

0.3728

1.4519*

0.3759

1.4562*

0.4213

1.5239*

Husband Black
Husband Hispanic

0.308

1.3607

0.2441

1.2765

0.2716

1.312

0.3054

1.3572

0.3517

1.4215

0.2471

1.2804

0.2455

1.2783

0.2506

1.2848

0.591

1.8058

0.4515

1.5707

0.3698

1.4475

0.3338

1.3962

Different Races

0.0184

1.0186

0.0492

1.0505

0.0402

1.041

0.0396

1.0404

Husband’s Education

0.0017

1.0017

-0.0141

0.986

-0.0164

0.9837

-0.0219

0.9783

Wife’s Education

0.0017

1.0017

-0.0083

0.9918

-0.0154

0.9847

-0.0142

0.9859

Husb. Age at Marriage

0.0002.

1.0002

0.0041

1.0041

0.0039

1.0039

0.0055

1.0055

Wife Age at Marriage

-0.0757

0.9271**

-0.0689

0.9334**

-0.07

0.9324**

-0.0745

0.9282**

Husb.’s Parents Divorced

0.6762
0.6771

1.9665**
1.9681**

0.6231
0.6203

1.8648**
1.8594**

0.5941
0.6096

1.8115**
1.8396**

0.5326
0.608

1.7033**
1.8368**

0.0154

1.0155**

0.0154

1.0155**

0.009

1.0091

Husband Asian
Husb. American Indian

Wife’s Parents Divorced
II: Division of Labor
Husb. Hours Paid Work
Wife Hours Paid Work

0.0019

1.002

0.0015

1.0015

0.036

1.0367*

Husb. Hours Male Tasks

-0.0244

.9759**

-0.0253

.9750**

-0.0926

0.9115
1.1210*

Husb. Hrs Female Tasks

0.0133

1.0134**

0.015

1.0151**

0.1142

Wife Hours Male Tasks

-0.0417

.9592*

-0.0386

.9621*

-0.2882

.7496*

Wife Hrs Female Tasks

0.0065

1.0065*

0.0066

1.0066*

0.0497

1.0509**

-0.1558

0.8557

0.1775

1.1942

III. Sense of Fairness
Husband Household

79. Steven L. Nock & Margaret F. Brinig, Weak Men and Disorderly Women:
Divorce and the Division of Labor, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: AN ECONOMICS
PERSPECTIVE 171, 181–82 tbl.10.4 (Robert Rowthorn & Antony W. Dnes eds., 2002).
Cox Proportional Hazards Regressions comparing unit change in variable to change in
divorce or separation risk for each month elapsing.
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Wife Household

-0.2478

0.7805**

-0.4391

.6446*

Husband Paid Work

-0.3753

0.6871**

-0.6066

.5452*

Wife Paid Work

-0.0176

0.9825

0.7369

2.0895**

0.0201

1.0203

-0.0218

0.9784

-0.0054

0.9946

III: Fairness-Hours
Interaction
Husband Fairness Paid x
Hours Male Tasks
Husband Fairness Paid
x Hours Female Tasks
Husband Fairness
H’hold x Hours Paid
Wife Fairness Paid x
Hours Male Tasks
Wife Fairness Paid x
Hours Female Tasks
Wife Fairness H’hold x
Hours Paid
Husband Fair H’hold x
Hours Male Tasks
Husband Fair H’hold x
Hours Female Tasks
Wife Fair H’hold x
Hours Male Tasks
Wife Fair H’hold x
Hours in Female Tasks
Husband Fair Paid x
Hours Paid Work
Wife Fair Paid x Hours
Paid Work
N
-2LL
Change (-2LL)

194

0.0884

1.0925*

-0.0141

0.9860**

0.0092

1.0093*

0.0029

1.0029

-0.0117

.9883*

-0.0079

0.9922

-0.0002

0.9997

0.0083

1.0084

-0.0199

0.9803**

2858
778.31
443.766**

44.070**

20.076**

24.066**
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TABLE 2
RACE/ETHNICITY AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE80
Race/Ethnicity

Percent of Total
in Foster Care

Number of
Children

White Non-Hispanic

36

203,001

Black Non-Hispanic

42

239,516

Hispanic

15

84,924

AI/AN Non-Hispanic

2

8910

Asian/PI Non-Hispanic

1

6304

Unknown/unable to
Determine

4

25,346

Total children in care

100

568,001

80. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS
REPORT: CURRENT ESTIMATES AS OF OCTOBER 2000 (4), at 2 (2000), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/ar1000.pdf.
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TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS81
Descriptive
Statistics

Standard
Deviation

N

13.3566

5.9787

15,315

1.55

3.45

15,024

5.22

6.83

15,177

0.13

0.15

15,271

.2759
.0001

.4470
.0114

15,315
15,315

16. 0201

1.7146

15,315

1.5149

.988

15,315

Household Income (000)

45.8461

49.7273

15,315

Mother’s Age

41.8328

6.5310

15,315

.0572
.7198
.0333
.1875
.2297

.2322
.4491
.1796
.3903
.4207

15,315
15,315
15,315
15,315
15,315

12.9383
.0026
.2075
.0553
.0129
.0556
3.461E-02

2.3667
.0510
.4055
.2286
.1130
.2292
.1828

15,315
15,315
15,315
15,315
15,315
15,315
15,315

.0027

.0517

15,315

CESD2 19—Item Depression
Scale
Monthly Use of Cigarettes,
Alcohol or Marijuana
Delinquency Scale, # Last
Month (of 15)
Chances of Dying < 35 or
Being Killed < 21
Child Lives with Mother Only
Child Lives with Dad Only
Child’s Age
Child’s Sex

Mother Never Married
Mother is Married
Mother is Widowed
Mother Divorced-Separated
Mother’s Prior Relationship
Ended in Divorce
Mother’s Years of Schooling
Mother is Hispanic
Mother is Black
Mother is Asian
Mother is Native American
Mother is Other Race
Child Adopted, Lives with
Adopted Parent(s)
Child Fostered, Lives with
Foster Parent(s)

81.
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TABLE 4
NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH:
DETERMINANTS OF ADOLESCENT PROBLEMS: WHITE MOTHERS82
( COEFFICIENT/STANDARD ERROR IN PARENTHESES)
Depression
Variable
Constant
Child Fostered
Child Adopted
Child in Kin
Care
Child Lives with
Mom Only
Child Lives with
Dad Only
Child’s Age
Child’s Sex
1=m, 2=f
Household
Income (000)
Mother’s Age
Mother Never
Married
Mother is
Married
Mother is
Widowed
Mother Divorced
or Separated
Mother ever
Divorced?
Mother’s Years
of Schooling
Child Hispanic
Child Black

6.127
(1.680)**
1.796
(1.338)
.564
(.285)**
1.621
(.516)**
.700
(.230)**
1.013
(4.017)
.416
(.034)**
1.169
(.113)**
-2.166E-03
(.001)*
-.162
(.026)**
2.220
(1.569)
1.077
(.478)
1.653
(1.565)
1.092
(1.526)
.483
(.152)**
-.162
(.026)
.983
(1.890)
2.519

Drug Use
-3.655
(1.130)**
3.737
(.925)**
.107
(.187)
.625
(.340)*
.642
(.151)**
2.912
(2.691)
.448
(.022)**
-3.807E-02
(.074)
-9.251E-04
(.001)
-2.098E-02
(.007)**
-.507
(1.060)
-8.454E-02
(1.026)
.117
(1.057)
-3.461E-02
(1.033)
.413
(.100)**
-5.550E-02
(.017)**
-2.051
(1.169)
-.857

Delinquency
5.970
(1.99)**
5.257
(1.584)**
.692
(.611)**
2.284
(.611)**
1.077
(.273)**
.910
(4.755)
.108
(.041)**
-1.945
(.134)**
4.29E-04
(.001)
-2.966E-02
(.013)**
2.429
(1.858)
1.587
(1.796)
1.673
(1.852)
1.662
(1.806)
.202
(.181)
-3.229E-02
(.031)
.152
(2.123)
.682

Morbidity
7.619E-02
(.041)*
6.79E-02
(.033)**
1.415E-02
(.007)**
2.00E-02
(.013)
1.287E-02
(.006)**
9.053E-02
(.098)
6.711E-03
(.001)**
-1.232E-03
(.044)
-7.972E-05
(.000)**
-5.568E-04
(.000)**
2.964E-02
(.038)
1.482E-02
(.037)
3.412E-02
(.038)
1.404E-02
(.037)
-4.210E-04
(.004)
-4.542E-03
(.001)**
-1.204E-03
(/044)
4.929E-02

82. The regression analysis for these tables was first reported in Brinig & Nock,
supra note 65.
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(.779)**
-.395
(.766)
1.045
(.681)
.474
(.275)*

(.512)
-.836
(.495)*
.489
(.447)
-1.015
(.181)**

(.922)
5.056E-02
(.891)
1.149
(.830)
1.369
(.327)**

(.019)**
1.177E-02
(.018)
7.056E-02
(.017)**
2.577E-02
(.007)**

* Indicates that coefficient is significant at p  .05;
** Indicates that coefficient is significant at p  .01.
A total of 403 children were adopted by both parents, of whom 78 were black. A total of
61 children were foster children, of whom 22 were black. A total of 484 children did not
have their mother or father living with them, but listed their aunt or grandmother as the
person “who acts in the place of a mother to you.”
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TABLE 5
NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH:
DETERMINANTS OF ADOLESCENT PROBLEMS: BLACK MOTHERS83
( COEFFICIENT/STANDARD ERROR IN PARENTHESES)
Depression
Variable
Constant
Child Fostered
Child Adopted
Child in Kin Care
Child Lives with
Mom Only
Child’s Age
Child’s Sex
1=m, 2=f
Household Income
(000)
Mother’s Age
Mother Never
Married
Mother is Married
Mother is Widowed
Mother Divorced or
Separated
Mother ever
Divorced?
Mother’s Years of
Schooling
Child Black
Child Asian
Child Native
American
Child Other Race

9.908
(2.269)**
5.170
(1.577)**
1.387
(.823)*
7.642E-02
(.595)
-9.883E-02
(.352)
.380
(.066)**
1.229
(.224)**
-4.164E-03
(.003)
-1.395E-03
(.017)
.186
(1.588)
-.270
(1.584)
-.483
(1.636)
.352
(1.583)
1.380E-02
(.317)
-.314
(.052)**
.439
(.833)
.160
(3.704)
1.441
(1.150)
-.578
(1.134)

Drug Use
.129
(.731)
-.558
(.500)
.205
(.254)
-3.953E-02
(.185)
.316
(.110)**
8.642E-02
(.021)**
-.473
(.070)**
-4.048E-05
(.001)
4.478E-03
(.005)
-.201
(.523)
-.278
(.521)
-.371
(.537)
-.161
(.521)
-.197
(.099)**
-2.857E-02
(.016)*
3.521E-02
(.263)
3.521E-02
(1.143)
.986
(.360)**
.2550
(.358)

Delinquency
11.286
(2.322)**
8.422E-02
(1.656)
.953
(.833)
.523
(.609)
.374
(.362)
-4.873E-02
(.068)
-1.666
(.230)**
3.545E-03
(.003)
-2.435E-02
(.017)
-1.780
(1.618)
-2.072
(1.614)
-1.821
(1.668)
-.828
(1.612)
-.374
(.326)
-5.455E-02
(.0107)
.136
(.856)
3.763
(3.774)
3.622
(1.181)**
-.960
(1.169)

Morbidity
.124
(.062)**
8.482E-02
(.043)**
-9.613E-03
(.022)
-1.472E-02
(.016)
1.264E-03
(.010)
6.941E-03
(.069)
-4.096E-03
(.006)
-2.919E-05
(.000)
8.124E-04
(.000)*
-5.345E-03
(.043)
-1.580E-02
(.043)
-2.243E-02
(.043)
1.036E-03
(.043)
-1.724E-02
(.009)**
-6.037E-03
(.001)**
-6.731E-03
(.032)
-1.061E-02
(.101)
-6.678E-03
(.032)
1.191E-02
(.031)

* Indicates that coefficient is significant at p  .05.
** Indicates that coefficient is significant at p  .01.

83. The regression analysis for these tables was first reported in Brinig & Nock,
supra note 65.

199

BRINIG.DOC

9/17/2019 4:21 PM

TABLE 6
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION, KINSHIP CARE, AND
FOSTER PLACEMENT BY RACE84
Effect by Race

Depression

Drug Use
(#/ month)

Juvenile
Delinquency

Perceived
Chance of
Dying

Adopted Child:
- White

.564**

.107ns

.692**

1.415E-02**

- Black

1.387*

.205ns

.953ns

-9.613E-03ns

- White

1.796

3.737**

5.257**

6.79E-02**

- Black

5.170**

-.558ns

8.422E-02ns

8.482E-02**

Fostered Child:

Child in Kincare:
- White

1.621**

.625*

2.284**

2.00E-02ns

- Black

7.642E-02ns

-3.953E-02ns

.523ns

-1.472E-02ns

N = 15,314

15,083

15,176

15,270

** = Statistical significance is .01 or less
* = Statistical significance is .05 or less
n.s. = Not statistically significantly different from zero

84. Brinig & Nock, supra note 65, at 474 tbl.3. All equations control for household
structure, child’s gender, household income, mother’s age, mother’s current and previous
marital status, mother’s education, mother’s race, and child’s race.
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